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I. Introduction
This Article examines liberal republican constitutional theory.
Liberal republicanism encompasses diverse theories' addressing the
problem of how political authority can overcome the tension between
the interests of individuals and majorities. Liberal republicans seek to
integrate the concerns of two competing models of constitutional the-
ory. The first claims that political institutions derive legitimacy by en-
forcing values that can be considered expressions of the community
will.2 Proponents of this model try to identify authoritative norms, or
assume that such norms will be defined by well-ordered political insti-
tutions. In contrast, the second model is skeptical of claims that polit-
ical institutions can identify, let alone enforce, community values.
Political institutions, its supporters argue, acquire legitimacy by repre-
senting private interests. Citizens engage in political association in or-
der to advance interests that they define and pursue independent of
the political community. According to the second model, political in-
stitutions exceed their authority either when they impede citizens' ac-
cess to the political processes that represent these interests or when
they fail to give these interests adequate consideration.3
Liberal republicans root legitimate political authority in the en-
forcement of community values, and also address the danger this en-
forcement poses for private interests that conflict with these values.
They believe that public discussion about the definition of community
values will dampen this conflict because citizens redefine their identi-
ties in response to the stimulus of political participation.4 Liberal
1. Leading theorists include Cass Sunstein, Frank Michelman, Sotirios Barber, and
Bruce Ackerman, each of whom has offered a republican interpretation of American con-
stitutional law.
2. John Hart Ely criticized what he termed as "non-interpretivist theories"-theories
that assert that "courts should go beyond [the text of the Constitution] and enforce norms
that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document." JoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1, 43-72 (1980). Ely considers Alexander Bickel the domi-
nant figure in this tradition. See id. at 71-72. Elsewhere, I have argued that this view is
based on a mistaken reading of Bickel. See Kenneth Ward, Alexander Bickel's Theory of
Judicial Review Reconsidered, 28 Amiz. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1996). In addition, I argue
that many of the theories Ely labeled "interpretivist" would also fit into this model. See
ELY, supra at 1-41. Interpretivists believe, according to Ely, that "judges deciding constitu-
tional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly im-
plicit in the written Constitution." Id. at 1. The important point is that these theories
enforce their interpretation of constitutional norms as community values. These theories
are addressed in the discussion of liberal republican criticisms of formalism. See infra text
accompanying notes 52-66.
3. See, eg., ELY, supra note 2.
4. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 171 (1992).
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republicans assume that the rights which promote vigorous political
participation will facilitate both the definition of community values
and the deliberations of individuals about their private interests.5
They draw one of two connections between political legitimacy and
the facilitation of individuals' deliberations regarding their private in-
terests: (1) political institutions derive legitimacy from the community
values that each citizen rationally accepts as an expression of his or
her will; or (2) political institutions derive legitimacy because the pro-
cess that defines community values benefits citizens by enhancing the
environment in which citizens select and pursue private interests. At
times, liberal republicans seem to treat both (1) and (2) as conditions
for political legitimacy.6 This possibility is not addressed in this Arti-
cle because it is foreclosed by the conclusion that defining community
values will entail restrictions on some citizens' deliberations about pri-
vate interests. Instead, (1) and (2) are treated as alternative founda-
tions for political legitimacy.
Liberal republicans overlook the tension between collective and
individual deliberation. As a matter of faith, liberal republicans be-
lieve that, given an environment conducive to deliberation, rational
people will be able to define community values that fully respect the
interests of each member.7 However, such an environment cannot be
achieved. For this reason, liberal republican theories fail. Their focus
on defining community values leads liberal republicans to underesti-
mate the tension between the process by which political institutions
identify community values and the corresponding process by which
citizens define private interests.
This Article's criticism of liberal republicanism fits into a broader
project that seeks to revitalize Alexander Bickel's approach to judicial
5. 'IWo trends in recent scholarship have influenced the liberal republicans. They rely
on the work of historians who argued that the framers of the Constitution were as much
concerned with ideals of the republican tradition-deliberation among virtuous citizens
leading to the common good-as the framers were with the liberal tradition's commitment
to protecting individual rights. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGNs
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); JOHN POCOCK, Ti MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975);
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). Liberal
republicans also extend the communitarian criticisms of liberal political philosophy. Com-
munitarians argue that liberal theories are premised on a false conception of the individual
as an autonomous being. They claim that liberals fail to grasp the extent that individual
character is determined by its associations within the political community. See generally
ALmDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (1981); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMrrs OF JUSTICE (1982).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 72-81.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 72-81.
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review. Bickel attempted to justify the exercise of judicial review in a
government that derives its legitimacy from majority rule. His de-
fense of judicial review contributed to a debate about whether or not
the Warren Court exceeded its authority when it limited legislative
power through broad interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Commentators at the time criticized the Court for usurping political
authority. These critics drew parallels to the discredited jurisprudence
of an earlier era in which the Court expanded the right of citizens to
control their property.9 Herbert Wechsler responded to these criti-
cisms, arguing that judicial review is legitimate only when judges
ground their actions in principles that can be defined independently of
any particular case.10 Wechsler nonetheless criticized the Warren
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education," contending that
the Court had failed to root its action in any neutral principle.' 2
Bickel extended Wechsler's argument, but defended the result in
Brown. He claimed that the Court supplements representative institu-
tions, and thereby strengthens the government's claim to legitimacy by
enforcing neutral principles. 3 But Bickel recognized that in order to
maintain its authority, the Court must also take pragmatic actions that
may conflict with Wechsler's notion that judges must ground their ac-
tions in neutral principles. Judges must sometimes act independently
of neutral principles, Bickel contended, either to avoid preempting the
democratic processes integral to a system of legitimate government or
to clarify the principled basis of legitimate government. 4 Bickel con-
cluded that the Court attempted the latter in Brown; it sought to re-
solve the conflicts among citizens' conceptions of equality.' 5
I am interested in three of Bickel's legacies. First, Bickel pro-
vides a structure for defending judicial review.' 6 He believed that it is
important to identify how the Court can contribute to a legitimate
government and to demonstrate that the Court's performance of this
8. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, TiE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17-18, 23-24 (2d ed.
1986).
9. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BIL OF RIGHTS (1958).
10. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that public school segregation violates equal
protection).
12. See Wechsler, supra note 10.
13. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 56-63.
14. See id. at 132, 244.
15. See icL at 244-72.
16. See id at 17-28.
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function does not undermine other determinants of governmental
legitimacy.
17
Second, Bickel illustrates a means for examining the relationship
between judicial authority and governmental legitimacy.'8 This Arti-
cle criticizes liberal republicans for failing to assess how judicial au-
thority affects private interests that must be protected by a system of
legitimate government.
This Article also addresses a third, and unfortunate, legacy of
Bickel-a legacy that explains in part why liberal republicans focus on
defining community values. Many theorists have misinterpreted
Bickel's claim that the judiciary supplements democratic institutions. 9
They have mistakenly interpreted Bickel as claiming that the Court
derives its authority by enforcing community values, norms that ex-
press the community will and thereby support a claim of democratic
legitimacy.2 0 Bickel believed, however, that the norms judges en-
force-this Article refers to these norms as "collective principles"-
are too abstract to be a source of judicial authority.2 ' Instead, Bickel
defined the role of the judiciary within a system of legitimate govern-
ment, a government that balances citizens' private interests with an
interest all citizens have in enforcing collective principles.2 Bickel
contended that easing the tension between these interests requires
nondemocratic means-judicial review-for enforcing collective
principles.'
Liberal republican theories fail because they attempt to defend
judicial review as democratic; they claim that enforcing community
values can serve as a basis for legitimate judicial authority. They ig-
nore Bickel's insight that a system of legitimate government must rep-
resent private interests as well as the citizenry's desire to enforce
collective principles. Consequently, liberal republicans never examine
how the process that defines community values actually influences cit-
izens' deliberations about their private interests. Liberal republicans
fail to realize that political institutions cannot define community val-
17. See id.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 25-35.
19. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23-24; infra text accompanying notes 25-35.
20. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE-FouNDATIONS 139, 261-62
(1991); ELY, supra note 2; KAHN, supra note 4, at 143; ROGERS M. SMrrH, LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90-91 (1985).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
22. See Ward, supra note 2.
23. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 27.
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ues without restricting some citizens' deliberations in a manner that
undermines liberal republican claims of political legitimacy.
After briefly examining Bickel's understanding of legitimate
political authority, this Article delineates how the liberal republicans'
quest to define community values weakens their arguments. First, it
examines liberal republican criticisms of two alternative conceptions
of government in order to identify their commitments to collective
and individual deliberation. Second, it argues that liberal republicans
suggest three arguments to link the legitimacy of judicial authority to
political processes that satisfy these commitments. Third, it demon-
strates that these arguments are insufficient because defining commu-
nity values entails placing limits on citizens' deliberations. These
limits make it impossible for some citizens to affirm these values as an
expression of their will and interfere with their deliberations about
private interests. This conclusion forces liberal republicans to give
priority to either collective or individual deliberation. Finally, the Ar-
ticle concludes that the deliberative benefits that citizens secure from
democratic government may help resolve an ambiguity in Bickel's
conception of legitimate government. This ambiguity obscures
Bickel's theory of judicial review.
H. Bickel's Defense of Judicial Review
To understand Bickel's theory, one must distinguish between his
discussion of legitimate government and his justification of judicial re-
view.24 Bickel argued that legitimate government is principled and
stable, and that it entails wide participation by its citizens.25 More
precisely, citizens acknowledge a set of principles that both instanti-
ates society's moral consensus and reflects their commitment to the
political community; a tradition of democratic politics has led citizens
to embrace abstract principles such as fairness and liberty. Citizens
will want to give these principles priority, Bickel suggested, so long as
the political system adequately represents their private interests.
Thus, a legitimate government must be democratic for two reasons:
First, its principles result from a history of political participation. Sec-
ond, elected institutions promote stability by representing citizens'
private interests.
26
24. For a fuller analysis of Bickel's theory of legitimate government, see Ward, supra
note 2. This section summarizes that essay.
25. See Ward, supra note 2.
26. See id.
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Bickel also defined the role of the judiciary within a system of
legitimate government. He argued that judicial review can be justi-
fied, even though it is not itself democratic, 7 because it represents
citizens' shared desire to enforce collective principles over private in-
terests. Although democracy is a precondition for the citizens' em-
brace of collective principles, Bickel noted that legislatures do not
always conform to these principles. He believed that legislatures are
too responsive to private interests and will sometimes take actions
that undermine political legitimacy.18 Judicial review is necessary to
counteract legislation that is inconsistent with collective principles.
Democracy is a necessary-not a sufficient-condition for legitimate
government.
In addition, the principles acknowledged by citizens are abstract,
and thus require interpretation. Principles must be clarified before
they can be enforced. Bickel's defense of judicial review concentrates
on how this process operated in Brown v. Board of Education,29 at its
essence a conflict over how to interpret the principle of equality.
It is possible to avoid confusing Bickel's discussion of legitimacy
and his justification of judicial review by distinguishing among three
different interests: (1) citizens' private interests; (2) citizens' shared
interest in assigning collective principles priority over private inter-
ests; and (3) citizens' desire to define and enforce community values.
Both (2) and (3) assume we can identify norms endorsed by members
of the community. But (3) differs from (2) because values are con-
crete, while principles are abstract. This distinction thus helps isolate
different claims people make about community norms.
Many of Bickel's readers assume that he claimed the judiciary
advances interest (3): that judicial authority is legitimate when judges
enforce community values. Bickel, however, did not base judicial au-
thority on this claim. The principles he discussed are too abstract to
be authoritative expressions of the community will. Bickel believed
that a legitimate government must both represent the claims of each
citizen and instill the sense that the decision-making process ac-
counted for his or her interests.30 Legislatures must resort to expedi-
ent compromises to achieve balance among citizens' diverse interests.
27. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 17-18, 23-24.
28. See id. at 25.
29. See id. at 244-72 (using Brown to illustrate how the Court can use its power to
encourage the political community's affirmation of an inchoate principle without unduly
limiting elected institutions).
30. See i at 192; ALEXANDER BICKEL, POLrTICS AND THE WARREN COURT 184, 194-
95 (1965).
178 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:171
Bickel was aware that the Court creates instability when it treats legis-
lative compromises that harm important private interests as expres-
sions of the community will.3 Therefore, instead of claiming that
judges gain authority by enforcing community values, he illustrated
how the judiciary and elected institutions collaborate in the quest for a
stable and principled government.32
Bickel therefore rejected the idea that judicial authority is legiti-
mate when the Court enforces community values. Instead, he con-
tended that judicial review is justified because it contributes to a
legitimate government.33 Legitimacy is achieved only by a system of
institutions that balances (1) private interests and (2) the interest citi-
zens share in assigning collective principles priority over their private
interests.34 Bickel argued that the Court can enforce principles while
remaining deferential to the institutions that represent private inter-
ests.35 In order to avoid confusion, this Article uses the terms "com-
munity values" and "community will" to refer to arguments that
involve interest (3).
Unfortunately, Bickel's discussion of (2) is vague. He asserted
that democratic participation leads citizens to acknowledge a common
set of principles without explaining how this came to be or why citi-
zens would want to give them priority over private interests.36 This
assertion creates the mistaken impression that principles receive dem-
ocratic sanction, and that the Court's authority rests on the enforce-
ment of community values. This problem is exacerbated by Bickel's
focus on the imperative that judges respect institutions that represent
private interests. He emphasized that the constitutional system of
separated powers limits the costs of judicial discretionY.3  These two
factors have led many constitutional theorists to interpret Bickel as
claiming that judicial review is democratic-and hence legitimate-
when judges enforce community values that limit judicial discretion.
38
Bickel maintained that judicial discretion is limited39 because he
wanted to establish that judges can enforce principles without promot-
ing instability. However, he recognized that judicial review cannot be
31. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 70-72.
32. See Ward, supra note 2.
33. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23-28.
34. See Ward, supra note 2.
35. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 95.
36. See id. at 30.
37. See id. at 71, 111-98.
38. See supra text accompanying note 20.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
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made democratic: Bickel never claimed to resolve what he called the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. Rather, he suggested that judicial re-
view can be justified, even though it remains undemocratic.40 Schol-
ars who concentrate on the question of judicial discretion overlook
Bickel's caution: The definition of community values should not
threaten private interests and thereby risk instability that undermines
a system of legitimate government. Liberal republicans make this
mistake. They do not fully define the participatory rights that they
assume will enhance citizens' deliberations about private interests.
Consequently, liberal republicans fail to see that defining community
values requires limits on citizens' deliberations. These limits would
make it impossible to consider the values expressions of the commu-
nity will, and would burden citizens' deliberations about their private
interests.
. Liberal Republicanism
Bickel and the liberal republicans have no obvious connection.
Liberal republicans do not champion Bickel's work, and some of their
claims have only an indirect relationship to judicial review. Bickel's
influence on liberal republicanism, however, is undeniable. Liberal
republicans circumvent the counter-majoritarian difficulty by defining
the Court's role in a system of political institutions that identifies com-
munity values. They claim that legitimate political processes enforce
these values and protect important private interests.4 Judicial author-
ity is legitimate, they propose, when judges enforce community values
or uphold rights of political participation that must be protected if we
are to consider these values expressions of citizens' will.
Liberal republicans seem to exploit Bickel's insight that legiti-
macy results not from the enforcement of democratically defined val-
ues, but from the interaction of political institutions. However, they
confuse the distinction between principles and community values.
While Bickel claimed that a legitimate government will institutionalize
the tension between private interests and collective principles, liberal
republicans believe that the process that defines community values
will necessarily enhance the environment in which citizens deliberate
about their private interests.42 For example, Frank Michelman de-
fined liberal republican politics as
40. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23-28.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
42. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEiN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUON 134-35 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter SUNSTEIN, PARTAL CONSTrruION]; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
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a process of personal self-revision under social-dialogic stimula-
tion. It contemplates, then, a self whose identity and freedom
consist, in part, in its capacity for reflexively critical reconsidera-
tion of the ends and commitments that it already has and that
make it who it is. Such a self necessarily obtains its self-critical
resources from, and tests its current understandings against, un-
derstandings from beyond its own pre-critical life and experi-
ence, which is to say communicatively, by reaching for the
perspectives of other and different persons.... [T]hese dialogic
conceptions of self and freedom are implications of the republi-• 43
can... ideal of political freedom in a modem liberal state.
He suggested that private interests will be protected because well-or-
dered political institutions ensure that deliberations among citizens
will encourage consistency between community values and individual
ends. 44
Although liberal republicans appear to exploit Bickel's concep-
tion of legitimacy, they stumble. Because they assume that political
authority is grounded in the enforcement of community values, they
concentrate on defining community values, and fail to realize that im-
posing the conditions necessary to achieve a consensus on these values
would interfere with citizens' deliberations about their own ends.
However, in exploring how the process of defining community values
conflicts with citizens' ability to select their own ends, it is possible to
discover an alternative source of authority. A legitimate system of
government derives its authority by contributing to citizens' delibera-
tions about private interests.
A. The Commitments of Liberal Republicanism
1. Criticisms of Pluralist Theories
Liberal republicans advance a political theory that emerges from
criticisms of two alternative conceptions of self-government: plural-
ism45 and formalism.46 They criticize pluralists for ignoring the influ-
ence of political institutions on both individual and collective
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555, 1567, 1570 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival];
Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 27-28 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Self-Government].
43. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic].
44. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
45. According to Sunstein, pluralists believe that
laws should be understood not as a product of deliberation, but on the contrary as
a kind of commodity, subject to the usual forces of supply and demand. Various
groups in society compete for loyalty and support from the citizenry. Once
groups are organized and aligned, they exert pressure on political representatives,
also self-interested, who respond to pressures thus imposed. This process of ag-
Fall 1996] LIBERAL REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 181
deliberation. According to the liberal republicans, pluralists assume
that citizens define their private interests and then seek to advance
these interests through political participation. In their view, pluralists
do not account for how political debate influences citizens' choice of
private interests.4 7
Liberal republicans contend that political processes can be struc-
tured to do more than regulate an anonymous marketplace and allo-
cate public resources to private pursuits. Rather than simply
representing individuals' existing preferences, political institutions
should encourage debate that defines and identifies community val-
ues.48 Liberal republicans assert that defining community values re-
quires intense and widespread political participation. Participation
will ensure critical evaluation of various competing interests because
citizens will face systemic pressure to defend their private interests as
they confront the perspectives of fellow citizens.49
Liberal republicans further argue that a well-functioning political
process must ensure the opportunity to define and adapt private inter-
ests so that the opportunity to pursue them will be meaningful.50
Thus, they conclude that the process of defining community values
gregating and trading off interests ultimately produces law, or political
equilibrium.
SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 24-25. Ackerman traced the pluralist
tradition from ALBERT BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1905), through DAVID
TRUMAN, Ti GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951), to ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLU-
RALIST DEMOCRACY (1982) and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pres-
sure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983). See Bruce Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 719 n.1l (1985). Ely's Democracy and
Distrust epitomizes pluralist constitutional theory. ELY, supra note 2. But see KAHN, supra
note 4, at 149 (noting that although Ely often accepts a pluralist theory of politics, he also
appeals to a more complex model).
46. See SuNsTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 95-104; Michelman,
Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1501. Their targets include a loose aggregation of theo-
ries that share a tendency toward formalism: ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA
(1990); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 193-204 (1960); Robert
Bork, Styles in Constitutional Interpretation, 26 S. TEx. L. REV. 383 (1984) [hereinafter
Bork, Constitutional Interpretation]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59
U. CmH. L. REV. 349 (1992); and Richard Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and
Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 154, 162, 169 (1987). Obviously,
these theorists are varied, as are the liberal republican criticisms of them. But each liberal
republican endorses a conception of government that expands judicial power to enforce
norms that would not be consistent with formalist tendencies manifested by these theories.
47. See SUNSTEIn, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 24-26, 175.
48. See id. at 163-64.
49. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1526-28; see also infra text ac-
companying notes 72-78.
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHm. L.
REv. 1129, 1150-52, 1158, 1166 (1986).
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will either lead citizens to adapt their private interests and consider
these values expressions of their will or lead citizens to accept the au-
thority of political institutions ,that contribute to their deliberations
concerning private interests.5'
2. Criticisms of Formalist Theories
Liberal republicans also criticize formalism. Formalist theories
attempt to circumscribe judicial authority by insisting that judges en-
force the values that are clearly rooted in legislation or the text of the
Constitution. Formalists seek institutional means for identifying the
collective will. They sanction political processes that balance individ-
ual freedom and the pursuit of community values. Institutions are
created to define and preserve the community, formalists assert, and
their operation is guided by rules that constrain collective action.
These governing rules originate and are legitimated during unique
moments of community creation. The rules may include the means
for altering institutional mechanisms and understandings of individual
freedoms.52
Formalists interpret the Constitution strictly, out of fear that judi-
cial power will be asserted to override the decisions of a legitimate
political process.53 They assume that the institutions of American
government are satisfactory because citizens continue to accede to
constitutional authority. They claim that the democratic structure cre-
ated by the Constitution reflects society's moral consensus, and that
judges who interpret the constitutional text as incorporating external
sources of morality exceed their authority.
54
51. See SUNsrEiN, PARTIAL CONSTITTION, supra note 42, at 193; Sunstein, Republi-
can Revival, supra note 42, at 1557.
52. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1496. Formalists are clearly pos-
itivistic in that they achieve legitimacy through a generally accepted rule. However, their
belief that these rules will yield authoritative values that reflect the community will distin-
guishes them from other positivists-including pluralists and some liberal republicans; mo-
ments of creation are embodied in written rules that are to be applied strictly by the
institutions they create. In addition, guiding rules do not necessarily provide liberal rights.
In this Article, formalists are assumed liberal because liberal republicans are responding to
formalist interpretations of the United States Constitution, particularly to their under-
standing of its provision of rights.
For H.L.A. Hart, a rule of recognition is acknowledged as identifying primary rules of
obligation. It need not be written; what is important is the community's-particularly its
officials'-acceptance of its content. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 92 (1961).
53. See, e.g., Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 365
(1981).
54. See Bork, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 46, at 383, 395.
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Liberal republicans criticize formalist theories for sacrificing pri-
vate interests to the enforcement of community values. They reject
formalist claims that the Court should enforce only norms that are
clearly expressed in the Constitution or defined by elected institu-
tions.5- Their attacks are primarily directed at recent Supreme Court
decisions in which statist holdings result because the Justices refused
to evaluate political actions against broader interpretations of consti-
tutional freedoms.5 6
Liberal republicans believe that formalist judicial decisions allow
momentary expressions of the community will to limit individuals'
freedom to pursue private interests and to undermine the conditions
in which citizens deliberate about individual and collective interests."
Formalists recognize only rights that were affirmed by people who
were accepted into the community during the period of their defini-
tion; dissenting or excluded minorities and newcomers face official
and informal barriers that restrict individual freedom to define and
pursue private interests.5 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick exemplifies
the excluding effect of formalist theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion. In holding that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, the Court acted as an
instrument of established law instead of venturing into the political
realm of declaring values.5 9 Justice White's opinion denies the Court's
authority to interpret the Due Process Clauses expansively; funda-
mental rights are derived exclusively from constitutional text and leg-
55. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1496, 1501-03.
56. Recent examples include Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), holding that
the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy; Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), upholding state drug laws
criminalizing the ceremonial ingestion of peyote against a free exercise challenge; and
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), refusing to interpret the First Amendment as
requiring an exemption to an Air Force regulation that prohibited Goldman from wearing
a yarmulke while on duty.
57. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1496, 1506, 1531, 1534. Obvi-
ously, formalist understandings can allow for evolution in community values. For instance,
Article V of the United States Constitution, the rules for amending the Constitution, can
be understood as providing a mechanism for expressing normative growth. However, be-
cause these theories are sensitive to the potential disorder of continuous competition be-
tween private preferences-or more cynically, in order to guarantee the continued
imposition of specific private preferences-such mechanisms are necessarily formidable,
thus ensuring stability within the community.
58. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1020 (1984) (arguing that law enforcement is a tool used by successful revolu-
tionaries trying to quiet dissent).
59. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1496-97.
184 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:171
islative determinations.60 Thus, Justice White concluded that the
political community does not recognize the right of individuals to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy, exposing such behavior to legislative reg-
ulation.6 1 Although homosexuals certainly possess the freedom to
combat burdensome legislation, their status as outsiders has histori-
cally impeded such efforts. 62
Liberal republicans also believe that restricting homosexuals'
freedom reduces diversity in the environment in which all individuals
define private interests. Both heterosexuals and homosexuals will be
forced to live in a culture in which closeted communities are denied
the opportunity to engage in political interactions that are likely to be
beneficial to the entire community.63 Conflicts among competing in-
terests encourage empathy, and thus enhance individuals' choice of
ends. As citizens learn to adjust their preferences to respect the per-
spectives of others, they also grow to appreciate those different
perspectives. 64
60. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
61. A formalist could argue that although the Constitution's silence on the issue of
homosexual rights allows states to regulate homosexual acts in the exercise of its police
power, the constitutional grant of federal authority does not encompass the same power.
This possibility is outside the scope of Bowers.
62. In Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), the Court invalidated a referendum that
illustrates the burdens that the Court can impose on excluded minorities when it enforces
community values. The referendum sought to deny homosexuals the benefits of their polit-
ical participation by proscribing the enforcement of legislation designed to combat discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation. See also ROBERT COVER, JusncE ACCUSED (1975);
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUsTICE (1976); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (Winter 1976). The history of African-Americans reveals
many of the difficulties imposed by formalist legal interpretations. First, efforts to promote
change, both in the elimination and administration of the system of slavery-such as en-
forcement of fugitive slave laws-were significantly burdened by the difficulty of satisfying
constitutional requirements. In addition, the post-Civil War history of segregation and
overt racism demonstrates the limited efficacy of ordinary political mechanisms in cor-
recting the burdens that deeply felt prejudices place on people's ability to live satisfying
lives. Even in the post-Brown era, constitutional formalism is used against political ef-
forts-such as affirmative action-to eliminate obstacles that have arisen from the rem-
nants of the previously discriminatory regime.
63. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1529.
64. See Michelman, Self-Government, supra note 42, at 29; Sunstein, Republican Revi-
val, supra note 42, at 1556, 1569-70. Sunstein recognized the virtue of empathy as provid-
ing a linkage between republican discursive theories and certain pluralist projects such as
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971): "In everyday life the exchange of opinion
with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things
from their standpoint and the limits of our vision are brought home to us," id. at 358. For
the criticism that Rawls' empathetic approach is not accompanied by dialogue, see Sun-
stein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1571. For a different view of empathy, see BOB
DYLAN, Positively Fourth Street, on "Bob Dylan's Greatest Hits" (Columbia Records
1967): "I wish that for just one time you could stand inside my shoes and for that one
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For example, Michelman discussed the impact of the civil rights
movement on the American political conscience. 65 He claimed that
we experience this impact individually and collectively. It is easy to
see that Michelman's claim has wider applicability; political toleration
has led to greater acceptance and appreciation of African-American
culture, which has increasingly become an important component of
the broader national culture since the 1940s. Today, it shapes all
Americans' understanding of art, music, literature, and other pursuits.
Finally, liberal republicans believe that the reduction of diversity
resulting from the restriction of homosexuals' freedom impedes col-
lective deliberation that might lead citizens to revise their conception
of the community.66 By reaffirming the lesser status of dissenters, mi-
norities, and newcomers, formalists shield the community from per-
spectives that challenge established constitutional values. Citizens
who are recognized in the existing order have a vested interest in the
political community, and little motivation to assess the need to accom-
modate the claims of outsiders. Liberal republicans believe that com-
munity values can evolve only if citizens are given effective
opportunities for communicating difference and dissatisfaction.
Michelman interpreted the Bowers opinion as legitimating the repres-
sion of unique perspectives. Homosexual lifestyles, he declared, chal-
lenge the privileged constitutional order,67 and formalist legal
interpretations perpetuate an environment in which citizens' narrow-
mindedness constrains the community's continued growth.
B. Tension Among Liberal Republican Commitments to Collective
and Individual Deliberation
In response to what they view as the limits of pluralism and for-
malism, liberal republicans consider politics to be a method for inte-
grating private interests and community values. Well-designed
political processes can mediate among citizens and yield what Sun-
stein considers to be a pragmatically objective consensus. He
contended:
[T]he republican commitment to universalism amounts to a be-
lief in the possibility of mediating different ... conceptions of
the public good, through discussion and dialogue. The process
of mediation is designed to produce substantively correct out-
moment I could be you. Yes, I wish that for just one time you could stand inside my shoes,
you'd know what a drag it is to see you."
65. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1530.
66. See iU. at 1529.
67. See id. at 1533.
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comes, understood as such through the ultimate criterion of
agreement among political equals. It is because of the belief in
universalism that republican approaches posit the existence of a
common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-function-
ing political process .... The republican belief in agreement as a
regulative ideal, and the republican conception of political truth,
are pragmatic .... They do not degend on a belief in ultimate
foundations for political outcomes.
Sunstein's statement exemplifies liberal republican claims. Lib-
eral republicans believe that community values emerge from a well-
ordered political process, and that these values derive authority be-
cause they are supported by a consensus among political equals.
69
This conception of politics seems to exploit Bickel's argument in that
it bases political legitimacy on the operation of a system of govern-
ment. Liberal republicans argue that rights should be designed to pro-
tect important private interests that must be guaranteed by a
legitimate government, °7 and that judicial review is legitimate when
judges enforce community values or uphold these rights.
When examined closely, however, the flaw in liberal republican
philosophy becomes apparent. Liberal republicans root authority in
community values because they take it as a matter of faith that broad
rights of political participation will allow political institutions to iden-
tify such values. In doing so, they underestimate the tension between
their commitments: Government institutions designed to identify
community values will not always yield the deliberative benefits in
which liberal republicans ground their claims of judicial legitimacy.
To address this problem, liberal republicans must first define the
requirements of political equality and then demonstrate how rights
that guarantee this equality will lead citizens to achieve consensus
about community values. 7'1 Alternatively, they must explain how
these rights would provide citizens benefits that could serve as a foun-
dation for political legitimacy.
68. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1554-55 (citations omitted).
69. See UL
70. See infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
71. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1557. Sunstein stated that
norms of equality will limit inputs and outputs of the deliberative process, but he did not
elaborate beyond proscribing exclusions from participation and undue burdens on classes
of people. It is also not clear why exclusions are proscribed, given the ends to be achieved
through participation. See also infra text accompanying notes 81-107.
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1. Guaranteeing Rights of Equal Participation
Liberal republicans believe that rights that promote vigorous
political participation link individual and collective deliberative
processes. Michelman noted that for republicanism to succeed as an
interpretation of American constitutional law, it must define a place
for individual rights within the larger theory. He stated that "republi-
can legal rights are bound to be concerned with participation, capaci-
tation and emancipation."'72 The processes that define and enforce
community values must respect private interests, which enhance dis-
course by contributing to the viability of alternative perspectives.73
Thus, liberal republican participatory rights should encourage contin-
ued scrutiny of community values because ongoing debate promotes
greater integration of individual and collective ends.74
Sunstein further noted that participatory guarantees include
rights such as free speech and antidiscrimination norms that are neces-
sary conditions for empathetic deliberation. 7 He suggested that
basic republican commitments will tend in the direction of guar-
antees of political deliberation, including the basic rights of
political participation; the republican beliefs in political equality
and citizenship will generate strong antidiscrimination
norms... and republican approaches will attempt to promote
deliberation among multiple voices in the political process.76
Freedoms of expression, conscience, and voting are recognized as fur-
thering participatory goals and therefore must be considered precon-
ditions of the political process. 77 However, he wrote, these freedoms
are not exclusively means to a collective end: They are preconditions
of a process that defines community values by facilitating citizens' de-
liberations about private interests.78
72. Michelman, Self-Government, supra note 42, at 43 n.229.
73. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1529; Sunstein, Republican Revi-
val, supra note 42, at 1549.
74. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1529; Sunstein, Republican Revi-
val, supra note 42, at 1549.
75. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 135, 144.
76. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1571.
77. See L at 1550-51, 1555; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 143;
Ackerman, supra note 45, at 717 (arguing for a reappraisal of the Carolene doctrine in
order to ensure citizen access to the institutions central to both ordinary pluralist and con-
stitutional politics); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) ("[I]t is unnecessary to consider whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation.").
78. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 184-85; Sunstein, Repub-
lican Revival, supra note 42, at 1551 n.58.
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2. Can Liberal Republican Rights Advance Both Individual and
Collective Deliberation?
Liberal republicans contend that rights of equal participation
contribute to a political process which will define community values
and will lead citizens to revise their own private interests.79 Sunstein
stated that this contention is
traceable to the republican conception of individual and polit-
ical freedom. On this view, individual freedom consists not in
the implementation but instead in the selection of ends. Such a
process emphasizes ... the value of overcoming the weakness of
the will, the possibility that private ends have been distorted by
unjust social institutions, and the importance of increasing avail-
able opportunities and information. The republican commit-
ment to political freedom is a generalization of these ideas.
Although alert to possible malfunctions in the governmental
process, republicans envision that process as a forum in which
alternative perspectives and additional information are brought
to bear, problems are revealed to be systemic rather than indi-
vidual .... 80
The appeal of liberal republicanism rests on the claim that a well-or-
dered political process will protect rights, ensuring that the definition
of community values will enhance individuals' deliberations about pri-
vate interests. Judicial authority, liberal republicans believe, is legiti-
mate when it enforces norms that emerge from a well-ordered
political process, or when the judiciary enforces the procedural re-
quirements of such a process.8 Although liberal republicans never
clearly identify the basis of legitimacy, their arguments suggest three
possibilities: (1) rights of political participation contribute to a polit-
ical process that achieves consensus about community values; (2)
79. See also supra text accompanying notes 72-74.- But see SUtNSTEIn, PARTIAL CON-
STIT1UTION, supra note 42, at 193-94. Sunstein appears less certain of the consistency of
these interests:
The most important point is that sometimes citizens in a polity will have collective
aspirations that depart from consumption choices. At least in general, those aspi-
rations deserve respect in a Madisonian system.
Sometimes ... interference with preferences can be justified on grounds of
freedom or autonomy. This is so when such interference protects against exces-
sive or illegitimate constraints on processes of preference formation .... [Flor
those trying to decide what a constitutional democracy should do, the better
course is not to proclaim reliance on context-free preferences ... but instead to
examine the settings in which reliance on existing preferences, or legal interfer-
ence with those preferences, will promote autonomy or welfare ....
id.
80. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1557 (citations omitted).
81. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]. See Ackerman, supra note
58, at 1013, 1016, 1049-51; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1551.
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rights of political participation provide access to-and enhance-so-
cial interactions within the community, and these interactions pro-
mote consensus; or (3) even if consensus remains impossible, rights of
political participation contribute to citizens' deliberations concerning
private interests, and this benefit compensates for any coercion exper-
ienced from the enforcement of community values.
This Article argues that liberal republicans cannot identify com-
munity values without impeding individuals' deliberations to an extent
that undermines their claims about legitimate government. First, a
consensus on community values is not likely in representative democ-
racies unless we limit citizens' right to participate in legislative delib-
erations. Liberal republicans could argue that electoral politics allows
people to contribute indirectly to legislative debate. However, an ex-
amination of the Constitution reveals that its representative institu-
tions are not designed to encourage the political interactions that
enhance citizens' deliberations about private interests.
Second, difficulties exist in securing social interactions that could
promote consensus by stimulating individuals' deliberations about pri-
vate interests. Conditions that enhance individual deliberation di-
verge from those that enhance collective deliberation. Therefore,
either rights of political participation will not ensure a social environ-
ment conducive to consensus or coercion will be necessary to secure
such an environment.
Third, when faced with the divergence between the requirements
of individual and collective deliberation, liberal republicans must give
priority to individual deliberation. A legitimate government cannot
sacrifice this vital interest in order to achieve a collective end. Conse-
quently, liberal republicans cannot claim that political institutions de-
rive legitimacy from enforcing community values.
Finally, the liberal republican focus on the relationship between
individual and collective deliberation illustrates benefits people gain
from representative government. These benefits might support
Bickel's assertion that citizens of representative democracies come to
acknowledge a set of principles-as opposed to community values-
that they believe outweigh private interests. Unfortunately, by focus-
ing on the conditions necessary to define community values, liberal
republicans lose sight of benefits that might be the foundation of a
system of legitimate government.
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a. Representative Democracy and Consensus
An examination of the issue of campaign finance limitations illus-
trates how representative processes must discourage individual delib-
eration if the processes are to achieve consensus about community
values. This suggests that the values defined by elected institutions
will not coincide with citizens' particular interests. Sunstein defended
campaign finance limitations, arguing that the limitations enhance de-
liberation by limiting the influence of political factions on the legisla-
tive process.' In his view, representatives are more likely to identify
community values if their deliberations about the common good are
not distorted by their prior commitments to financial supporters.
Although greater independence increases the likelihood that leg-
islators will identify community values, enhancing political delibera-
tion among representatives yields no analogous benefits to people
outside the legislative process. Sunstein concentrated on the condi-
tions that enable citizens to consider those norms that are defined by
political institutions as authoritative expressions of the community
will. 3 Sunstein believes that citizens contribute to the process that
defines such norms, but suggested that their right to participate is
subordinate to the ends he seeks. 4 Sunstein considered defining com-
munity values more important than citizens' participatory rights.
Sunstein endorsed participatory rights because they promote rep-
resentation of diverse views.8 5 But, according to Sunstein, statutes are
valid if they are supported by preferences that have survived a well-
ordered legislative process.8 6 His concern for legislative deliberation
suggests that citizens would play a comparatively passive role in the
legislative process. They would exercise their rights of participation
only prior to legislative debates. In contrast, legislative discourse
leads representatives to reach consensus as they revise their positions
in response to competing claims. In Sunstein's conception, the repre-
sentatives' constituents would not participate in the discourse that
transformed their representatives. Thus, a discrepancy would arise
between the perspectives of legislators and the private interests of
82. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1556, 1569, 1576-78. Sunstein
also argued that participation is necessary to further civic virtue. However, because the
discussion of campaign limitations is concerned with national politics, it is logical to think
that the primary benefit advanced is limiting factions. Sunstein argued that participation at
the local level is the source for instilling civic virtue. See infra note 88.
83. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 81.
84. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1551.
85. See id at 1571.
86. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 81.
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their constituentsY. In addition, this disjunction between perspectives
of legislators and their constituents could breed dissatisfaction and
alienation from the political process. This in turn might become a dis-
incentive for citizens to engage in political activity of any kind.s8 Lib-
eral republicans should not assume that rights of political participation
will guarantee a unified collective will.
More significantly, taken to its logical conclusion, Sunstein's justi-
fication for campaign limitations would support restrictions on indi-
viduals' participation that would make it impossible for them to
consider legislation an expression of their will. Although Sunstein
claimed that no citizen should be denied an opportunity to partici-
pate,89 it is not clear that the right of participation includes an oppor-
tunity to influence legislative deliberations about community values.
Representatives may not be able to identify community values unless
some citizens' ability to influence legislative deliberations is limited.
Sunstein attacked Buckley v. Valeo's9 ° statement that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment." 91 In endorsing limitations that correct for dis-
tortions in the political process, Sunstein implied that the speech of
the wealthy can be limited to secure benefits of deliberation for the
community.' Of course, the limitations Sunstein considered are sup-
87. See Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE
L.J. 1, 39-40 (1989).
88. But see Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1556, 1569. Sunstein be-
lieves that political participation is also necessary to promote virtuous citizens. Civic vir-
tues are qualities of citizens that allow them to achieve collective ends. Civic virtue will be
instilled primarily through participation in local administration within a system of decen-
tralized authority. It is possible that citizens' development of civic virtue will lead them to
revise their private interests in a manner that parallels the transformation experienced by
their representatives. But this possibility appears far fetched because the legislative pro-
cess that initiated this transformation normally involves more diverse interests. Local
populations tend to be more homogeneous, and thus local issues involve conflicts among
fewer perspectives. Engagement with such issues may instill the necessary concern for the
community without providing the experience of accommodating-diverse viewpoints, which
enhances individual deliberation and leads to convergence between the perspectives of
legislators and their constituents. It would be a wild coincidence if citizens achieved the
same perspective of the common good as their representatives even though they had quali-
tatively different political experiences.
89. See it at 1552.
90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down certain regulations of campaign contributions).
91. Sunstein, Republican Revival supra note 42, at 1577 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
48-49).
92. See id. ("A deliberative conception of the First Amendment, incorporating a norm
of political equality, would lead to quite a different analysis from the marketplace model
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ported by a norm of equal participation. They would only limit the
relative influence of the wealthy and would not prevent anyone from
participating. However, Sunstein defined participation and equality in
terms of the requirements of a well functioning deliberative process:
"[P]rivate autonomy must be justified in public terms."93 Political par-
ticipation is protected because it furthers collective ends by promoting
civic virtue 94 and limiting the influence of factions on governmental
processes. 95
Yet, combatting factions might require more extreme restrictions
on some citizens' participation in the deliberative sphere, such as lim-
its on their access to representatives. These restrictions would create
a gap between legislation and the will of citizens that cannot be
bridged by the participatory opportunities that Sunstein believes must
be offered by well-ordered political processes.96 Popular opinion
sometimes allows factions to distort the legislative process. Sunstein
contended that exposure to diverse perspectives will facilitate the defi-
nition of community values.9 7 But legislators will not seriously con-
sider ideas in tension with the expressed interests of vociferous
majorities-or sometimes minorities. They will not exploit these ideas
if it means risking their incumbency. Even well-funded minority opin-
ions will not convince legislators to risk electoral defeat by acting
against vociferous interests. Sunstein argued that the current distribu-
tion of wealth should not be permitted to distort legislators' delibera-
tions about which norms best reflect community values.98 Why should
an existing distribution of opinion be allowed to wreak the same evil?
Political participation could be limited in situations in which legis-
lative deliberations are distorted by popular opinion.99 Assuming leg-
islative independence advances collective decision-making, insulating
legislators from the negative influence of constituents would allow
them to take seriously arguments that are in conflict with their constit-
uents' expressed interests. Legislative decisions would then be based
on the weight of the evidence rather than on the pressure exerted by
93. Id. at 1551.
94. See supra notes 82, 88.
95. See supra note 82.
96. See supra notes 82, 88.
97. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1571.
98. See id. at 1577.
99. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic
Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1651, 1652 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republican-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1708 (1988). Fitts and Powell noted a similarity between Sunstein's
insulated dialogue and adjudication, and expressed concern about the potential an-
tidemocratic tendencies of the requirements of due process.
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voters. For example, a large majority of Americans favor lower taxes.
Many beneficial programs require higher taxes to fund their imple-
mentation. If representatives could deliberate in a protected environ-
ment, they would take the pro-tax arguments more seriously. This
environment can be secured by shielding legislative votes and debate
from the public. A cone of silence could be erected to limit speech
rights to prevent information concerning legislative activities from
reaching constituents. Not only would people be discouraged from
participating in the deliberative process, they would also be prevented
from doing so.
Sunstein could respond by identifying less coercive means of
strengthening the presentation of perspectives that conflict with popu-
lar opinion. These means might include government subsidies for mi-
nority speech or more direct educational programs. However, this
response introduces the larger problem of the government defining
the requirements of adequate political discourse. Political delibera-
tion is expected to create a foundation for legitimate government ac-
tion, notwithstanding significant conflicts among citizens' favored
policies. The discretion to distribute speech subsidies or to determine
the ends served by education threatens freedom by allowing officials
to use public power to further particular visions of the public good.
Correlatively, these reforms must be implemented to ensure that
public debate is empathetic and transformative. A government offi-
cial would be required to evaluate the adequacy of political discourse.
This evaluation will be influenced by the official's assessment of the
public's receptivity to competing arguments and by his opinion of
these arguments. The extent of governmental intrusion necessary to
correct distortions in the deliberative process will correspond to the
level of discord among competing interests. As discord increases, so
will the danger of an official's biases-concerning the substance of the
debate-tainting his or her evaluation of whether deliberative re-
quirements have been satisfied.' 00 It is difficult to believe that one
can construct a model of nondistorted debate by which to measure
discussion of controversial issues-such as health care, welfare,
crime-without anticipating the result of the discussion.' 0 '
Rather than emphasizing legislative deliberation, liberal republi-
cans could assume that greater integration of the electoral and legisla-
100. See generally LUCAS A. PoWE JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1987). Sunstein also seems to acknowledge this problem. See CASS SUN-
STEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 179 (1993).
101. See supra note 100.
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tive spheres ensures that citizens participate in political deliberations.
On this view, voters choose representatives after evaluating past per-
formance and analyzing their positions on issues that have been the
subject of public debate-including, but not limited to, debate in the
legislative body itself. The electoral decision that brings representa-
tives into office has a deliberative quality. Communication between
legislators and voters enhances the deliberation of both, which pro-
motes consensus. Therefore, maintaining conditions for such deliber-
ations would be an alternative justification for limitations on
campaign expenditures; limitations enhance individual as well as legis-
lative deliberation. They make it easier to challenge incumbents be-
cause challengers' voices are less likely to be overwhelmed by
opponents' superior media resources. 02 Greater electoral competi-
tion allows more perspectives to be brought to the voters, which in
turn encourages legislators to apply lessons learned from monitoring
public discussion.
Although this reconceptualization of politics establishes a nexus
between individual and collective decision-making that provides a
foundation for participatory rights, it does not reflect American repre-
sentative democracy. The Constitution establishes a political structure
that does not encourage deliberation among citizens. Although citi-
zens' responses to political debate influence legislative outcomes, they
are not likely to affect the quality of legislative discourse. Empathetic
deliberation depends upon citizens who are willing to re-evaluate their
interests in response to compelling arguments. It demands that par-
ticipants work together to identify common goals and to pursue them
through the election of like-minded representatives.
Winner-take-all election rules provide candidates a disincentive
to engage in policy debates likely to inform their constituents. Politi-
cians must situate themselves near the center of the political spectrum
and still distinguish themselves from their opponents. Normally, it is
risky to support controversial positions that can generate dialogue be-
cause one's rival will likely-and rationally-portray the position as
outlandish rather than discuss its merits. Instead, emphasizing charac-
ter issues and personal appeal tends to be a sounder electoral
strategy.
0 3
102. I am assuming that limiting contributions will increase electoral competition. This
is obviously a controversial assumption, but its accuracy does not affect the conclusion of
the argument.
103. See DOUGLAS AMy, REAL CHOICES NEW VoicES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 61-62 (1993); BENJAMIN PAGE, CHOICES AND
ECHOES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECrIONS 178 (1978).
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At first glance, the 1994 congressional elections seem to counter
this analysis of American government. However, on closer examina-
tion, the Republican Party strategy supports it. The GOP based the
"Contract with America" on extensive polling data. It sought to avoid
controversial positions and, instead, exploited what it believed to be
an unrepresented consensus. Republican candidates appeared to as-
sume radical positions, but did so by drawing a contrast with Demo-
crats who they considered to be outside the political mainstream.
Thus, the Republicans did not encourage debate about competing pol-
icy positions. Instead, they portrayed Democrats as extremists and
trusted the public to affirm their prediction of a shifted political
center. Similarly, during the 1996 elections, Democrats strove to por-
tray the Republican-controlled Congress as extremist.
Electoral requirements will inevitably push debate across political
spheres-an example is the recent debate on health care-but these
discussions are not designed to inform the public and solicit the input
of additional perspectives. Public discussion is framed as a series of
"yes" or "no" choices. Should universal health care be prescribed?
Are employer mandates necessary? This form of discussion encour-
ages candidates to be ambiguous about the rationale underlying ques-
tions of policy and to appeal for support without informing
constituents about the reasoning that favors alternative conclusions.' 0 4
Any substantive reasoning usually amounts to assertions or appeals to
private interests without any analysis of the balance of costs and bene-
fits expected from competing policies: "Universal health care is good
because middle class people like you sometimes lose their health
care." Or even: "Middle class people like you may lose some privi-
leges, such as choice of doctors or procedures under plans with
mandates."
This form of debate offers little opportunity to discuss and con-
sider the policy problems and the distributive consequences of partic-
ular solutions. Voters usually evaluate decisions based on who won
and lost the political fight rather than the merits of the chosen policy.
When a bill is finally passed, representatives often focus their efforts
on taking credit and assigning blame rather than explaining the sub-
stantive reasons underlying the legislative conclusions. 0 The incen-
tive to interpret compromises as victories allows politicians to assume
responsibility for bills vastly different from the ones they originally
104. See AMY, supra note 103, at 64-67; PAGE, supra note 103, at 152, 176.
105. See DAVID R. MAYHEw, CONGRESS: THE ELEcroRAL CONNEMCON 53-65 (1974).
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sought. Therefore, constituents are reaffirmed in their choice of sides
rather than encouraged to deliberate about alternative proposals.
Liberal republicans offer their approach to constitutional inter-
pretation as a critical and aspirational view of American government.
However, these problems result from a system of representation that
empowers local, rather than national, interests. Incumbents stay in
office by responding to the concerns of a local electorate rather than
the needs of the wider population.10 6 Instead of promoting delibera-
tion among a well-informed population, American political structures
yield representatives who maintain their status by encouraging stasis
among constituents, and yield citizens who are adept at interpreting
political information in a manner that confirms their preconceptions
about the issues under discussion. °7
b. Social Interactions as an Alternative Source of Consensus
Liberal republicans also argue that rights of participation en-
courage the kinds of social interactions that promote consensus. Their
broad conception of the political arena situates political interactions
within a wider social context. Individual rights not only allow individ-
uals to contribute to legislative deliberation, liberal republicans argue,
but also reflect our recognition that political appeals must have a wide
reach if an asserted norm is to be considered a community value.
Treating a norm as a community value indicates that it has widespread
support within the population. Representative democracies reward
political appeals that attract broad support among the population.
Electoral incentives make legislators sensitive to the interests of blocs
of constituents. These incentives encourage citizens to convince legis-
lators that a sizable group will vote according to a shared belief or
interest. Citizens generate public support by introducing themselves
and their positions to a wider audience. It is citizen initiative, then,
that expands the sphere of legislative deliberation.
Messages aimed at legislators are often delivered through
means-such as protests or media campaigns-that are likely to gar-
ner a wider audience and thereby place greater pressure on legislators.
Groups that establish themselves as political forces have usually se-
106. See generally Amy, supra note 103. In contrast, if the electoral system divided
representation proportionally-based upon a national electorate-the risk of innovation
would be counterbalanced by an electoral position made more precarious by a more un-
predictable electorate. It would provide an incentive to strive for better policies and would
reward those who communicate the merits of a policy.
107. See Herbert Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Some Reasons Why Information Cam-
paigns Fail, reprinted in PUBLIC OPINION 296-99 (Susan Welch & John Comer eds., 1975).
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cured a place in the collective consciousness. According to this view,
rights that facilitate political participation promote consensus as citi-
zens and political representatives engage-and are engaged by-dis-
cordant voices. In addition, wider political interactions enhance
citizens' deliberations concerning private interests. This benefit com-
pensates for coercion experienced from the enforcement of commu-
nity values and therefore can serve as a foundation for a claim of
political legitimacy.
Liberal republicans, however, do not address the tension between
individual and collective deliberation. This tension undermines their
claim that participatory rights contribute to a social environment that
encourages consensus. The claim that political legitimacy can be
rooted in the deliberative benefits citizens gain from wider political
interactions can survive this tension. But liberal republicans must first
abandon the idea that government authority is legitimate because it
enforces community values. Instead, liberal republicans should con-
centrate on the interests that must be represented by a system of legit-
imate government. The tension between individual and collective
deliberation forces liberal republicans to modify their theories. They
must abandon their assumption that authoritative norms will be de-
fined if political institutions respect citizens' concern for the environ-
ment in which they select their ends. Instead, providing such an
environment is itself a condition of legitimate government.
(1) The Link Between Individual and Collective Deliberation
Ackerman argued that the authority of community values is de-
rived from the political environment in which individuals deliber-
ate.108 Citizens, he asserted, must have ample opportunity to weigh
community values against private interests.10 9 Authoritative norms
are those that achieve widespread acclamation. However, he modi-
fied this conception out of a concern for the conditions in which citi-
zens determine their interests. Ackerman originally claimed to "dis-
solve"' the counter-majoritarian difficulty by premising legitimate
judicial authority on the enforcement of values that genuinely reflect
those of the community. The Constitution establishes an institutional
structure that ensures that no norm can survive either formal or infor-
108. See Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1022, 1030.
109. See id at 1020-21.
110.Id. at 1013, 1016.
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mal amendment processes unless it receives near-universal affirmation
in conditions conducive to deliberation."'
Widespread participation narrows the gap between legislative
and electoral politics on important issues. Because citizens participate
in the same deliberative process as do their representatives, values do
not become authoritative unless they are consistent with citizens' un-
derstandings of their private interests.12 According to Ackerman,
constitutional values result from processes in which ordinary citizens
exert greater influence than they do in normal legislative processes
and also have an opportunity to reflect about the relationship between
the asserted norm and competing private interests." 3 Thus, such val-
ues are representative of the community, and judicial authority is le-
gitimate when it invalidates contrary legislation." 4
But even if Ackerman is correct in linking the enforcement of
community values to their consistency with most citizens' understand-
ings of their private interests, his approach cannot ensure that all indi-
viduals will affirm the community's values. Although his
interpretation of the constitutional structure affords minorities signifi-
cant influence in the political process, supermajorities are still in a po-
sition to use public institutions to express their hostility to weak
minorities. The political weakness of a detested minority allows for
collective choices that limit interests they deem fundamental, includ-
ing rights of political participation." 5 The possibility that majorities
will threaten individuals' fundamental interests undermines Acker-
man's claim that judicial authority is legitimate because it enforces
community values. It does, however, validate Bickel's skepticism con-
cerning such norms. Bickel premised legitimacy on representing both
citizens' private interests and their shared interest in enforcing collec-
tive principles rather than on the authority of community values. He
111. See id- at 1039, 1042-43.
112. See idt
113. See id. at 1030, 1042-43.
114. See id.
115. The Constitution's protection of slavery as a value is the clearest example of such a
norm, but the post-Civil War discrimination against blacks also appears to be an example.
Decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and blatant segregation in the
armed forces and District of Columbia school system suggest some acceptance of the
norms. Although it is not clear that this attitude was subject to the debate Ackerman
requires of a collective norm, it seems that issues of race were widely discussed in the
aftermath of the war, and the expressions of discriminatory attitudes in state legislatures,
local councils, and federal institutions could support such norms.
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claimed that instability arises when compromises among private inter-
ests are treated as expressions of the community will."
6
Discrimination against minorities also subverts liberal republican
claims that individuals derive compensatory benefits from participat-
ing in a more diverse political environment. Discrimination counter-
acts the benefits of diversity by limiting interactions between targeted
groups and the wider public. Discrimination reduces opportunities for
individuals to explore social relationships that may influence their
conceptions of private interests. To the extent that majorities require
minority support-or can identify with the position of minorities-
significant discrimination appears unlikely. However, contemporary
attitudes concerning, for example, communists, atheists, religious cult-
ists, and others indicate that in certain circumstances minorities re-
main vulnerable to the community will.
117
The possibility of a supermajority intent on discriminating against
minorities is troubling, but is beyond institutional remedy. Even the
best conception of legitimate authority will not prevent discrimination
in a population whose attitudes conflict with fundamental values re-
flected by the political structure. A society that can expose minorities
to such hardships is not likely to respect an adequate conception of
equal citizenship. But Ackerman's attempt to limit judicial discretion
by raising the threshold for enforcing community values leads to a
more serious flaw. Divisions within a pluralist society will prevent the
emergence of norms that condemn discrimination against certain mi-
norities. For example, the Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick demonstrates the limits of antidiscrimination norms. Bowers
burdens gays by condoning homophobia and discouraging open inter-
action between gays and the wider community." 8 Ackerman has little
basis for challenging the opinion. Neither formal nor informal consti-
tutional processes have recognized a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy."19
In his book We the People, Ackerman attempted to impose an
additional constraint on legislatures. He revised his theory, arguing
that judges have authority to propose interpretations that reconcile
conflicting constitutional norms.120 Although the legislation chal-
lenged by Hardwick is consistent with the scope of public authority
116. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
117. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); supra note 62.
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM.
L. REv. 1431, 1435; see also Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1497, 1533.
119. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1497, 1533.
120. ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 157-59.
200 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:171
sanctioned by New Deal era norms, Ackerman suggested that consti-
tutional values are better interpreted by emphasizing that the legisla-
tion conflicts with founding era norms favoring individual liberty. 2'
This adjustment of the theory reflects a different attitude toward pub-
lic authority: Judicial authority is valid because it resolves conflicts
among community commitments. The legitimacy of judicial authority
in Ackerman's revised theory is no longer contingent on the Court's
ability to enforce norms that satisfy an objective standard of validity.
Ackerman's original argument was attractive because the norms
enforced by the judiciary were clear manifestations of the will of the
community. However, even if the Court could maintain the clarity of
norms by faithfully'22 resolving the tensions between constitutional
traditions, it remains unclear why the norms of a past generation
should resolve the conflicts of the contemporary community.2 3 Ack-
erman evaded this criticism by asserting the contemporary commu-
nity's interest in reconciling past expressions of its values. This
interest has priority over individuals' pursuit of private interests
through majoritarian processes.
Ackerman's justification of judicial review must support a level of
discretionary authority that suggests affinity with Bickel's approach.
A closer examination of Bowers indicates that Ackerman's theory
needs further adjustment. The case reflects the dearth of values capa-
ble of conclusively resolving many constitutional issues. The Bowers
opinion was bolstered by clear evidence of the past community's an-
tipathy toward homosexuals.' 24 The argument that antisodomy laws
are inconsistent with privacy interests protected by the Bill of Rights
is better supported by an interpretation of the general commitments
of the contemporary community 25 than by prior expressions of the
will of the People. The controversy in the aftermath of Bowers con-
firms the absence of authoritative norms. Either the statute should
have been upheld as an expression of a legislative process that was
sufficiently subject to popular control or it contravened an inchoate
principle implicit in the commitments of the wider community. The
121. Id. (defending Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), but implying that the
logic of the defense extends to Bowers).
122. By "faithfully," I mean in a manner that is consistent with both traditions. Faith-
fulness is required if Ackerman is to maintain the validity of judicial authority by its con-
nection to past manifestations of the community's will.
123. See KAHN, supra note 4, at 176-77.
124. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986).
125. Of course there have been no clear expressions of these commitments, and efforts
to limit the rights of homosexuals, such as the referendum at issue in Romer v. Evans, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996), provide evidence to the contrary. See supra note 62.
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interpretive freedom necessary to resolve Bowers is not consistent
with Ackerman's original claim to "dis-solve" the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. Thus, rather than asserting that judicial inter-
pretations clearly reflect community values, Ackerman illustrated how
judges interpret ambiguities in constitutional norms subject to future
clarification by the People. 126 Decisions such as Bowers become stop-
gap interpretations until the question is resolved by the emergence of
a definite constitutional norm.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty remains because a similar ar-
gument can be used to support the original legislative resolution of the
same conflict. Why should the judiciary's interpretation of constitu-
tional values be privileged over the legislature's? Ackerman believes
that because the actions of the elected branches do not necessarily
express the will of the People, one can justify the Court's voiding leg-
islation that arguably conflicts with constitutional values.12 7 The
Court's interpretive exercise would then encourage the contemporary
community to exploit the constitutional sources it possesses. Instead
of representing past manifestations of the public will, the Court would
synthesize principles established in the past, with an eye toward future
refinement when citizens are more focused on constitutional poli-
tics.'z The Court, then, would offer an interpretation of community
values that bridges past and future expressions of the will of the Peo-
ple. It would promote individual and collective deliberation by invit-
ing citizens to resolve its conflict with the legislature. In Ackerman's
view, the Court would thus encourage citizens to decide which inter-
pretation of constitutional norms better reflects their understanding of
the relationship between private interests and community values. His
adjusted argument extends an implication of Bickel's conception of
legitimacy: Legislatures sometimes undermine the conditions of polit-
ical legitimacy. 29 Ackerman recognized that in cases such as Bowers,
legislatures act illegitimately when they preempt citizens' delibera-
tions about community values.1
30
Ackerman's adjusted theory directs judicial authority toward ad-
vancing individuals' deliberations about the relationship between
community values and private interests. Yet his revisions do not es-
tablish whether promoting individual deliberation has priority over
126. See ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 131-62.
127. See Ud at 261-62.
128. See id at 161.
129. See supra text accompanying note 28.
130. See ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 261-65.
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defining community values. Ackerman expressed skepticism about in-
stitutional determinations of the community will.' 3' This skepticism
results from a belief that community values emerge from a grueling
process that provides citizens adequate opportunity to determine how
they view the community in relation to their private interests.13 2 The
constitutional system subjects affirmed norms to continued examina-
tion and debate in order to reflect evolution in the relationship.
Therefore, although community values override many private inter-
ests, one would expect that political institutions must remain subject
to participatory norms that protect individuals as individuals. Even
assuming the absence of the Bill of Rights, constitutional ends would
be contradicted by community norms endangering citizens' continued
participation.
Surprisingly, Ackerman seems to reject this interpretation be-
cause he believes that rights gain their authority as expressions of the
People's will.' 3 3 But given Ackerman's understanding that judicial in-
terpretation contributes to a process in which people have adequate
opportunity to deliberate about the relationship between community
values and their private interests, one would assume that courts
should override norms that contradict this aim. Community support
for norms that hinder ongoing debate would offend the Constitution's
understanding of community. Ackerman claimed that egalitarian de-
mocracy surfaced in the aftermath of the New Deal era's rejection of
laissez faire. This result seems inevitable when one considers Acker-
man's understanding of the constitutional project. It is not surprising
that a community committed to democratic self-criticism will gravitate
toward norms that focus on the requirements of participating in the
process that defines community values. Although the system of lais-
sez faire may have reflected participants' understandings of how their
collective interactions were to be ordered, to the extent that it pre-
vented individuals from participating in collective definition, it contra-
dicted the premises of the constitutional project. If people organized
a government to advance their interest in defining community values
and private interests, it is not surprising that they would eventually
reject norms in conflict with this interest.
134
131. See id at 181-83, 263.
132. See id. at 260-94.
133. See id. at 319-22.
134. Correlatively, if the Constitution is a means by which individuals clarify their pub-
lic and private commitments, retreating from principles that have advanced these ends
would be inconsistent with the goals of the Constitution. Ely noted a dominant trend in
Constitutional history toward expanding the pool of participants in constitutional politics.
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Liberal republicans link individual and collective deliberation.
The political community emerges as people discover values that are
consistent with their private interests. Because the community results
from individuals' ordering their private interests, political institutions
must respect rights that promote individual and collective delibera-
tion. Judicial authority will be justified to the extent that it can define
these rights in a manner that advances this vision of the community.
Ackerman's transformation is paradigmatic: The tension between
community values and private interests leads liberal republicans to
emphasize the environment in which people select their ends rather
than any end itself. But liberal republicans must also confront the
tension between requirements of individual and collective delibera-
tion. We will see that liberal republicans concentrate on defining com-
munity values, and fail to realize that the conditions that advance
collective deliberation will interfere with the processes by which some
people arrange their ends.
(2) Tension Between Individual and Collective Deliberation
Sotirios Barber clarified the relationship between the deliberative
needs of individuals and those of the community. 135 Although he rec-
ognized that individuals have priority over the state, he underesti-
mated the tension between individual and collective deliberation.
Barber defined a typical citizen of an ideal state as someone "gov-
erned by an attitude that places the highest social or political value on
the activity of reasoning about how to live." '136 He believes that the
Constitution is the means by which citizens define a conception of the
good society and substantiate their aspiration for community.
137
Because rational beings should be skeptical about their ability to
discover a best conception, any conception must be considered tenta-
tive. Barber contended that rights of participation ensure that citizens
remain self-critical. Community can only be an aspiration among citi-
zens committed to "reflective self-criticism. '138 The Constitution es-
tablishes the path by which citizens pursue this commitment to
rationality. Defining processes that allow rational citizens to order
their ends is the aim of constitutional thinking. The Constitution does
See ELY, supra note 2, at 99. Although one can imagine continuing to expand the range of
eligible players, contracting it seems to violate a fundamental principle. Once people are
admitted as equals, their equality is defined in terms of their ability to participate.
135. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT =H CONSTITUTION MFEANS (1984).
136. Id. at vii.
137. See id. at 34-37.
138. Id. at 140-41, 143-44.
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not outline the ends of a good society, but instead the means to pursu-
ing one. Its authority is derived from respecting the needs of citizens,
maintaining appropriate conditions for the constitutional project.
Therefore, the quest for community self-creation entails a distinction
between the norms defined by political institutions and the rights nec-
essary to respect the nature of individual participants.
Barber further distinguished short- and long-term authority as
well as the ideas of autonomy that support them. Short-term commu-
nity values gain authority by the affirmation of autonomous citizens,
who seek to ensure that these values are consistent with their best
understandings of constitutional provisions.'3 9 As the legal means for
pursuing an idea of the good society, the Constitution must be a
source for authoritative norms.'4 0 Barber contended that constitu-
tional language and tradition establish interpretive parameters in
which rational individuals determine whether short-term legal author-
ity is consistent with their understanding of community values.' 4'
However, constitutional authority must remain flexible. Barber be-
lieves that the long-term authority of the constitutional system is
achieved by respecting citizens as rational beings. 42 Rational individ-
uals recognize their fallibility and corresponding need to remain self-
critical. 43 Consequently, the definition of community values will
evolve as will the understanding of the constitutional means by which
we express our autonomous nature.'"
Individual autonomy, in Barber's view, becomes both the means
for evaluating institutional performance and the basis of public au-
thority.145 A legitimate constitutional order will respect individual au-
tonomy through the provision of rights that reflect the evolving nature
of the project. 46 These rights restructure the relationship between in-
dividual and collective deliberation. They are defined to ensure that
any community value satisfies a standard of respect owed to citizens.
Barber's conception of rights, however, serves the interests of cit-
izens belonging to a certain type of community. It does not necessar-
139. See id. at 57.
140. See id. at 42-45.
141. See id. at 36-37, 121-22, 147-57.
142. See id. at 57-61.
143. See id at 140-41, 143-44.
144. See id. at 57-61.
145. See id. at 55-60.
146. See id. at 59, 108, 111, 122, 144, 161-62. Barber criticized governments that point to
citizens' support as evidence of their legitimacy but fail to provide rights of speech and
privacy. These rights allow for adequate reflection and are necessary if we are to take
seriously citizens' decision to support their government.
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fly respect their needs as individuals. The search for community
values causes Barber to overlook the possibility that the requirements
for individual deliberation might diverge from those of collective de-
liberation. For instance, Barber's conception of citizenship satisfies a
collective commitment to rational thought.14 7 His discussion of the
Constitution's antagonism toward racism and religious zealotry illus-
trates how the requirements of rational thought circumscribe individ-
ual freedom.' 48 Citizens do not have the right to pursue their interests
when they violate collective norms of rationality. He argued that the
scope of religious liberty is shaped by the community's traditions and
beliefs:
[O]ur backgrounds influence the hypotheses we put forward in
c]onstitutional interpretation. So in the case of Jonestown...
who is prepared to say that the political progeny of Jefferson can
begin with his general ideas and, through a process of dialectical
progression and refinement, end up taking pride in their tolera-
tion of Jonestown style free exercise.149
Obviously, a reasonable conception of religious toleration would not
encompass the excesses of Jonestown. Yet, Barber's attack is con-
cerned with the religious community's conflict with citizens' commit-
ment to rationality as much as it is with extreme manifestations of the
conflict. According to Barber, such communities cannot expect toler-
ation as a matter of right, but only as it serves an interest citizens
share in challenging community presuppositions.' Illiberal associa-
tions are tolerated because they force a reconsideration of basic con-
stitutional commitments-such as our commitment to rationality.
Barber argued that such associations are protected to the extent that
"they [have] remained credibly voluntary and [have] adhered to crimi-
nal laws, compulsory school laws and other public policies.' 1
The collective commitment to rationality not only circumscribes
competing private interests, it also mandates the use of public re-
sources to nurture a virtuous-liberal-citizenry through the elimina-
tion of obstructions to clear thinking. 52 The Constitution's pursuit of
rational discourse is a collective good that competes with private pur-
suits and takes precedence over inconsistent interests. Barber must
justify this priority. But the need for justification is masked because
147. See id at 140-41, 143-44.
148. See id. at 142-43.
149. Id at 142.
150. See id at 143.
151. Id
152. See id at 129, 143. Racism and religious zealotry are such obstructions.
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participation in the political community yields benefits that also fur-
ther private interests. Maintaining the conditions for sufficient delib-
eration about the public good-a condition of collective rationality-
requires the provision of rights that would also seem to advance indi-
viduals' deliberations about private interests. 53 In addition, limiting
citizens' participation in illiberal particular communities sometimes
enhances individual deliberation.'54 Because these additional benefits
offer alternative means of justification, they complicate an analysis of
Barber's claim that the common venture should preempt private
interests.
Barber can forego a defense of this claim if the political commu-
nity can employ the same means to promote citizens' deliberations
about private interests and community values. This possibility under-
lies the efforts of other liberal republicans to link individual and col-
lective deliberative processes. By examining these efforts to define
rights that reflect the requirements of a deliberative community, how-
ever, one discovers situations in which they conflict. The end of ad-
vancing collective deliberation becomes problematic when programs
designed to liberalize the community preempt individuals' own delib-
erations-especially their deliberations involving their place within
the political community. When political institutions interfere with
these deliberations, they threaten an interest that must be respected
by a system of legitimate government.
(3) The Threat to Individual Deliberation
Michelman's conception of participatory rights indicates how the
quest to define community values can interfere with citizens' delibera-
tions about private interests. His argument encompasses the claims
that participatory rights encourage consensus about community values
and also advance citizens' deliberations about private interests.155 Di-
verse social interactions enhance both individual and collective delib-
eration. 56 Participatory rights can be understood as increasing
diversity by protecting people at the fringes of the community and
153. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
154. See BARBER, supra note 135, at 143. For example, Barber believes we must en-
force the Constitution's idea of collective rationality by restricting groups that use coercion
to influence the thinking of their members.
155. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1532-37.
156. See id. This idea is also implicit in Sunstein's criticism of what he calls status quo
neutrality; he argued against people who uncritically accept as just distributions that result
from legal decisions, especially when those distributions interfere with political delibera-
tion. See SUNSTmN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 3-7.
Fall 1996] LIBERAL REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 207
enabling their perspectives to challenge contemporary under-
standings.'57
For example, Michelman discussed how judicial support of the
civil rights movement broadened the substantive base of republican
discourse. As African-Americans sought to redefine the meaning of
their citizenship, they expressed principles that originated from, yet
conflicted with, the understandings of the larger community. Their
activities provided judges, legislators, and the general citizenry with
additional perspectives from which to evaluate community values.'
Michelman therefore criticized Bowers as offensive to "the modern
republican commitment to social plurality.' 15 9 Bowers excludes per-
spectives that force people to re-examine their own positions. 160 In
doing so, Michelman recharacterized the right to privacy. Rather than
exclusively establishing a zone in which individuals are protected from
public authority, these guarantees also yield a collective good. They
promote diversity, and thereby contribute to both individual and col-
lective deliberation.
16 1
In criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 62 Robin West made a related argument. In Smith, the
Court held that because the Free Exercise Clause does not protect
religious practices burdened by generally applicable neutral laws, the
First Amendment does not prohibit the application of Oregon crimi-
nal drug laws to cases of ceremonial ingestion of peyote. 63 Hence,
the Court concluded, the state's denial of unemployment benefits to
individuals fired for such use was constitutional. 6" West argued that
the Smith decision threatens a cultural practice, which in turn hinders
157. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1532-37.
158. See iL at 1530-31.
159. Id. at 1532-37.
160. See id. at 1497, 1533.
161. See id. at 1534-1535; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 42, at 1544, 1548-49,
1557, 1569. These theories obviously need some basis for evaluating the importance of a
practice to a particular community and the legitimacy of the particular community itself.
For instance, if a drug user wanted to demonstrate the burdens of legislation against him as
a drug user, liberal republicans would have to weigh the importance of allowing citizens to
explore those options. Logic suggests that the result would depend on how the practice in
question interferes with the community both in itself and as a means for individual devel-
opment. One can imagine that the practices of a particular community of thieves or mur-
derers would severely undermine these goals. The case of drug use will depend upon an
analysis of its effects on people's minds and the behavior it encourages.
162. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra note 56; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43,
at 1502-03.
163. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
164. See id.
208 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:171
the greater community's moral development. 165 She asserted that
First Amendment principles should be interpreted as protecting diver-
sity in order to further society's pursuit of truth. 66 She contended:
[D]issent is protected to preserve its capacity to show us truth
about our collective political lives in order to render the hidden
sphere in each of us visible. What is honored and protected is
not the insulated individualistic act of expression, but the socie-
tal, critical and above all cultural act of morally responsible
communication. The measure of our liberality becomes not the
extent to which we can tolerate the offensive, hateful, or simply
unpopular ideas of others, but the degree to which we individu-
ally take responsibility for the truth of our utterances and collec-
tively value and nurture the communicative and truth-
promoting realms of critical culture and political dissent. 67
Diversity promotes the identification of community values as individ-
uals are encouraged to re-examine their own positions and to appreci-
ate political relationships that foster the pursuit of truth.
168
However, Michelman and West fail to recognize that citizens
value political association differently. This disparity undermines
claims that political authority is legitimate because it enforces commu-
nity values that reflect consensus among citizens or because rights of
political participation advance citizens' deliberations about private in-
terests. Some citizens value the definition of community values as an
individual end. Others believe that political debates contribute to
their own thinking about private interests. Furthermore, other indi-
viduals value political engagements only as a means to pursue private
interests or reject such relationships because they infringe on the pur-
suit of such interests. The requirements of maintaining conditions for
adequate deliberation will burden people who seek to avoid or limit
social interaction.
Liberal republicans seek to define rights that promote social in-
teractions among diverse groups, 69 but these rights sometimes inter-
fere with the deliberations of people who seek to minimize social
contacts. Tension arises between liberal republican interests in indi-
vidual and collective deliberation because these processes have differ-
ent requirements. In contrast to individuals, a liberal state has less
freedom to pursue ends defined by its deliberative processes. Liberals
165. See Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seri-
ously, 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 43, 96, 103 (1990).
166. See id. at 96.
167. Id
168. See id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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are skeptical of claims concerning the good life and therefore define
rights that advance an idea of collective rationality. These rights guar-
antee that community values remain subject to continuing scrutiny
and allow the state to revise its ends. They also ensure that the gov-
ernment does not prevent citizens from pursuing private interests that
conflict with governmental determinations of the community will.
Consequently, skeptical assumptions prevent liberals from fully pursu-
ing ends that foreclose the pursuit of competing goods.
For example, certain ends-most notably religious ideas of the
good-are premised on truth claims that supersede rival ideas. A
community cannot pursue Christian ends without subordinating other
goods to basic doctrines of an authoritative church. Skeptical assump-
tions limit a community's pursuit of its ends. They prevent liberals
from having an internal understanding of such ends: Liberals are un-
able to share the perspective achieved by believers, who can fully pur-
sue their chosen ends.
The considerations that inform liberal notions of collective ra-
tionality should not determine the analogous notion of individual ra-
tionality. In contrast to the political community, individuals can attain
an internal perspective concerning illiberal ends without foreclosing
the pursuit of rival ends. The liberal state reduces the risk assumed by
individuals who forego their right to revise their interests in order to
gain an internal perspective of a lifestyle. The state guarantees that
those who pursue illiberal interests can later revise their choices in
light of the experience of their pursuit. 170 There is a spectrum of
choice bridging the limits of collective and individual rationality. Re-
quirements for collective deliberation will not necessarily guarantee,
and will sometimes conflict with, citizens' freedom to pursue illiberal
ends that involve choices within this spectrum, choices that enhance
individual deliberation.
(4) Resolving Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Decision-
Making
West lamented the failure of the Smith decision to address the
claims of the Native American Church and to encourage contact be-
tween its unique perspective and perspectives of the greater commu-
170. Of course, in pursuing certain interests, individuals can isolate themselves and
render their choices irrevocable. Jonestown demonstrates that people can preempt state
intervention on their behalf. Certainly, when a pursuit of private interests prevents revi-
sion, its rationality can be questioned.
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nity.171 Yet the history of the case illustrates that Americans' respect
for privacy underlies our conception of religious freedom. Smith re-
flects a societal commitment to respect freedom by allowing religious
pursuits to be conducted with minimal public examination. This com-
mitment impedes citizens' engagement with certain unconventional
perspectives that liberal republicans believe advance individual and
collective deliberation.172 The case demonstrates the practical diffi-
culty of breaching the anonymity of certain communities, even a com-
munity at the center of a significant political controversy. In Smith,
the Native American Church's interest was threatened and vindicated
without heightening the Church's profile.
The case arose because the Oregon legislature was indifferent to
the burdens its legislation imposed on a largely unknown popula-
tion. 73 The opinions of the Court and subsequent legislative correc-
tion-the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993174-expressed
no interest in the culture of the Native American Church because
each approached the problem as one of balancing competing interests.
They assumed the legislative interest in curbing drug use and Smith's
free exercise interest were in a zero-sum game and offered different
ways of balancing public and private interests.
The Smith majority eliminated the balancing test that ensured re-
view of free exercise interests even when legislatures did not act from
discriminatory motives: Collective interests that did not invidiously
target private pursuits were to prevail. 75 Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissent assume that each interest
has to be respected, and debate the weight of those interests. 76 The
substance of the religious belief did not concern the Justices except as
it clarified the weight of the free exercise burden.77 The treatment of
the competing interests reflects a commitment to separate religious
practice and public authority. 7 ' Finally, the legislation that over-
turned Smith affirmed this inclination to preserve private spheres of
religious activity without expressing any desire to promote interac-
171. See West, supra note 165. at 103.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
173. A useful contrast is the manner in which alcohol regulations are drafted to accom-
modate mainstream religions.
174. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
175. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-85.
176. See id. at 899, 903-906 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 909-919 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
177. See id at 886-87, 906-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (free exercise jurisprudence
rejects the propriety of examining the content and accuracy of people's religious beliefs).
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tions among people with diverse beliefs.7 9 Thus, the Smith Court's
failure to facilitate contact between the Native American Church and
the wider culture reflects a societal commitment to respect people's
privacy.
Thus, West's deliberative culture depends upon social interac-
tions discouraged by a political structure that perpetuates isolation
among the particular communities constituting the political commu-
nity. On the other hand, Smith does not implicate the liberal republi-
can interest in maintaining conditions for political deliberation. The
freedom to pursue private interests-including religious ends-pro-
vides experience that is crucial to individual deliberation. Therefore,
the societal concern for privacy that informs the diverse responses to
the issue posed in Smith may still be consistent with liberal republican
aims.
But even if religious freedom contributes to liberal republican
aims, the scope of freedom necessary to further individual delibera-
tion is larger than that needed to define community values. Sacrific-
ing individual deliberations to collective goals treats the political
community as an end rather than a means by which citizens identify
and pursue competing commitments, including commitments to the
political community itself. West's statement about the value of a de-
liberative culture is ambiguous as to whether its value is derived from
its contribution to collective or individual ends. Liberal republicans
must establish that defining community values does not unduly bur-
den individuals' deliberations about their own interests.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 80 offers an opportunity to analyze conflicts
between individual and collective deliberations. In defending its com-
pulsory education laws, Wisconsin asserted its interests in promoting
individual and collective ends, interests that confficted with the Amish
community's religious freedom. The State claimed that "some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system.... [E]ducation prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in soci-
ety."'181 The majority opinion in Yoder affirmed the Amish interest in
religious freedom. It measured the State's educational needs based on
the costs that Amish culture imposed on society. The State's burden
was slight because the Amish were well socialized; their consumption
of the State's welfare resources was reasonable, and they demon-
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
180. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
181. Id. at 221.
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strated no unusual propensity toward criminal activity.1' However,
the opinion did not adequately address Wisconsin's claim. Its educa-
tional requirement advanced two complementary interests: (1) it pre-
pared people to make autonomous choices concerning their lives; and
(2) it satisfied the political system's need for autonomous partici-
pants. 83 Wisconsin's interest in nurturing autonomous citizens sup-
ported action to prevent citizens from denying themselves experiences
that would contribute to their deliberations about private interests.18
However, in establishing educational standards that advance
these goals, the State limited individuals' freedom to assume obliga-
tions of membership in particular communities and, in turn, to evalu-
ate the competing claims of these communities. Wisconsin's interest
in promoting autonomous citizens interfered with Amish deliberations
about their private interests. The requirement of compulsory educa-
tion denies the Amish an opportunity to review and revise their
choices after experiencing the consequences that result. Therefore,
two questions must be answered: First, does the irrationality of the
choices made by the Amish justify state intervention? Second, assum-
ing that the Amish have not made irrational choices, does the State's
182. See id. at 222.
183. See id. at 221.
184. The State's interest in nurturing autonomous citizens is itself two-fold. The State
also has an interest in preventing others from interfering with citizens' deliberations. This
issue is relevant to a discussion of the extent of state authority to advance individual delib-
eration by limiting private interests. Justice Douglas raised the issue of the right of Amish
children to an education in his dissent in Yoder. In contrast to their parents, Amish chil-
dren were not pursuing an end that they had selected. It is not clear why the State should
allow parental pursuits to jeopardize their children's deliberative processes. The children's
interest went beyond the State's asserted aim of reducing their burdens should they choose
to leave the community, and encompassed a concern for the conditions in which they
choose to arrange their commitments to the Amish religion and the larger political
community.
The case for intervention is strongest when a child seeks assistance in continuing his or
her education. However, without such a plea, there should be a presumption against state
interference. The limitation on state action is unfortunate-especially in cases when it
undermines the State's interest in promoting individual deliberation. But if we believe that
promoting individual deliberation is a worthy end, we would not want to run the risk of
excessive state control of educational requirements. There is a risk that educational re-
quirements will advance the State's interest at the expense of individuals. The power can
easily be abused because it is easy to support a claim that a parent is not providing a child
with a satisfactory education. If we are not careful in limiting state interference-beyond
establishing general goals that an education must advance-the instances of justifiable
state action might corrupt the end of promoting individual deliberation. The more the
State specifies the requirements of adequate deliberation, the easier it is to gear these
requirements to secure deliberative results the State favors. This seems contrary to the end
of encouraging autonomous deliberation. Only in extreme cases should the State be able
to step in to ensure that people's options are not being prematurely foreclosed.
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interest in promoting collective deliberation justify preempting Amish
deliberations?
One could justify limiting Amish religious pursuits because of
their failure to adequately consider their own interests and because
their choices do not leave opportunity for reconsideration. The impo-
sition of social interactions could be seen as enhancing the conditions
in which they deliberate about their interests. Given their limited ex-
posure to competing options, one could certainly question their
choices. However, it is not clear that such an intrusion is warranted.
Notwithstanding their idiosyncrasies, it is not obvious that the Amish
are irrational.
Liberal republicans suggest that advancing individual delibera-
tion provides citizens a benefit that can serve as a foundation for polit-
ical legitimacy.'85 Therefore, liberal republicans should be skeptical
of the idea that government should preempt individuals' thought
processes in order to correct their deficiencies. In identifying the
point at which people's choices foreclose revision and re-evaluation of
their ends, a liberal republican government would presume its citizens
were rational; this presumption would certainly favor the Amish
position.
The second question is more complicated. Liberal republicans
hope to legitimate political authority by providing participatory rights
designed to promote consensus about community values or to advance
citizens' deliberations about private interests.18 6 Because the require-
ments of individual deliberation diverge from those of collective delib-
eration, liberal republicans must determine their priority when the
two conflict. If freedom is defined as a means for securing collective
ends, Wisconsin should be able to limit Amish religious freedom so
long as that end is advanced. Barber would contend that the Amish
refusal to submit to educational requirements justifies governmental
coercion. He tolerates illiberal communities only to the extent that
societal tolerance serves the collective interest, and only so long as
they respect the society's educational requirements. 87
But the sacrifice demanded of the Amish seems excessive. The
idea that collective needs determine the development of a particular
community insults that community's members. Defining religious
freedom in terms of the requirements of defining community values
preempts citizens' deliberations about private interests that challenge
185. See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
187. See BARBER, supra note 135, at 143.
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liberal notions of rationality. These deliberations are valued only
when they contribute to the needs of the wider political culture.
Although it is not unusual to have a choice concerning the conduct of
one's life devalued by the trump of a collective interest, Wisconsin's
action did more than limit freedom. Community values are deemed
worthy of respect because citizens have been given the opportunity to
determine the relationship between these values and their private in-
terests. State action against the Amish community implies that the
Amish's choices are in need of paternalistic modification because
they have not adequately considered the collective interest.
c. Bowers v. Hardwick: The Priority of Individual Deliberation
In Yoder and Smith, the conflict between individual and collective
deliberation was masked by the assertion of claims for religious free-
dom. In addition, religious communities are by nature competitors of
the political community. Therefore, restraints on religion are viewed
with suspicion. In contrast, the importance of individual deliberation
is implicated by Bowers. An examination of the case and its aftermath
illustrates how tolerance contributes differently to individual and col-
lective deliberation.
In Bowers, the government incursion against the gay community
is severe because the restriction of freedom undermines the status of
homosexuals within society and thereby discourages individuals from
evaluating openly gay lifestyles as they organize their commitments.
Considering the general nonenforcement of antisodomy laws before
and after the decision, it is difficult to believe that the case places any
direct burden on the freedom to engage in homosexual sodomy. The
subsequent response to the decision confirms that opponents' greater
concern is improving the status of the gay community within society.
The protests and political activism spawned by the opinion seek more
than the indifference of a tolerant community willing to ignore what it
perceives as deviance within private enclaves. The dominant political
message emerging from the gay pride rallies, the Gay Games, pro-
posed curricular reforms, and antidiscrimination measures is that
homosexuals should be accepted participants in public life.
Bowers is offensive because it harms homosexuals by discourag-
ing open interaction with the wider community, not because it under-
mines collective deliberation. If anything, deliberations within the
political community have been enhanced by the Bowers decision.
Michelman interpreted Bowers' exclusion of minorities as damaging
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the political community's interest in maintaining diverse discourse. 8
However, it is not clear how Bowers affects political deliberation. In
order to sustain the claim, antisodomy laws would have to limit the
development of the gay community and impede its subsequent inter-
actions within the larger society.
Although Bowers harms individual homosexuals, it has not weak-
ened the gay community. Not only are bans on homosexual sodomy
virtually unenforced, they also do not prevent interactions among
homosexuals or discussions of homosexual issues that would be criti-
cal to community formation. One could argue that a collective ex-
pression of antipathy for the gay community dissuades individuals
from engaging in activities that expose their sexual preference to the
wider community. Even though it is likely that certain individuals
have been deterred from participating in the gay community, their ab-
sence has not prevented the emergence of this community. Indeed, it
has developed partly in response to the hostility of the wider culture.
Furthermore, homosexuals' outsider status may have contributed
to their emergence as a distinct community. Other outsider cultures
have recognized that strength results from isolation. Insularity pro-
motes internal discipline that counteracts the assimilating influences
of the wider culture, and many have sought to maintain it when
threatened by outside incursions.'89 As the Amish example indicates,
religious communities often seek to be free from interference by the
wider community in order to strengthen and perpetuate themselves.
Obviously, the gay community does not embrace discrimination in or-
der to maintain the fecundity of its culture; the idea of proposing dis-
crimination as a means to enhancing discourse within the wider
culture is equally absurd.
In addition, Bowers did not hinder collective deliberation by dis-
couraging interactions with the gay community. If anything, Bowers
has inspired political activity that has increased the influence of the
gay community and has advanced collective deliberation. Although
the antigay sentiments expressed in Bowers may have encouraged
people to close themselves to the claims of the gay community in the
short run, Bowers has led to the increased exposure of the gay com-
munity as it evolved into a political force. Communities often gain
strength in responding to dangers inflicted from outside.190 Events
188. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43, at 1532-37.
189. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHER.ES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALrry 64-68 (1983).
190. See id.
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such as the Stonewall uprising and Bowers itself have fueled the polit-
ical commitment of the gay community. They provide an organiza-
tional incentive that reduces the cost of political action and may have
led to political clout in some areas of the country.191 This strength
facilitates contacts with the wider community that render the particu-
lar community less strange and more worthy of empathy.
1 92
In attacking Bowers, Michelman drew an analogy with Brown v.
Board of Education.93 The analogy is apt. Brown resulted from a
community's demanding equality in response to trauma inflicted by
the wider community. Michelman cited the influence of the civil
rights movement on American political life to support the claim that
protecting homosexual rights promotes diversity that facilitates the
definition of community values. 94 But his argument would also seem
to suggest that the State's racist and homophobic policies promoted
political debate by eventually making the oppressed groups more in-
fluential. The absurdity of defending Bowers because it promotes di-
versity again indicates the important benefit citizens derive from
participating in a rich social environment, a benefit that is independ-
ent of any subsidiary contribution to collective deliberation. Bowers
offends our understanding of how people should be treated. It is not
problematic because people should have the freedom to act indepen-
dently of the collective good or because diversity enhances the condi-
tions for individual choice that contribute to the definition of
community values. By discouraging participation in the gay commu-
nity, Bowers interferes with citizens' deliberations about private
interests.
C. An Assessment of Liberal Republicanism
Sunstein discussed the wide variety of theories consistent with re-
publicanism.' 95 This range of support is attributable to the relation-
ship between individual and collective deliberation: Individual
deliberation contributes to collective decision-making, but has in-
191. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECtiVE ACION-PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
192. The gay rights movement has strengthened since Bowers. Clearly, concern for the
victims and potential victims of AIDS has been an important factor-probably the most
important factor. Although public awareness of Bowers is comparatively nonexistent, it
provides gay activists independent means for mobilizing their supporters. In addition, by
validating legislation that attacks homosexuals, the Court reinforced the perception that
the government's disdain for gays determines its response to the disease.
193. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 43.
194. See id- at 1533.
195. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 186-87.
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dependent value as the means by which people define private inter-
ests. The tension between these ends confuses the foundation of
institutional authority in liberal republicanism, and liberal republicans
must choose between these commitments. Rather than enforcing or
facilitating the definition of community values, a liberal republican ju-
diciary should be concerned with ensuring citizens' opportunities to
enjoy conditions that enhance deliberations about private interests.
Liberal republicans neglect this fundamental conflict because
they concentrate on defining community values. Their mistakes fol-
low from confusion about the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Bickel
believed that political authority should not be premised on the contro-
versial claim that an institution enforces community values. Instead,
norms derive authority from the institutions that define them, and in-
stitutions gain authority by contributing to a system of government
that represents private interests and citizens' desire to enforce collec-
tive principles. 196 Because liberal republicans believe that institutions
can identify community values, they also assume that the process
which defines these values will necessarily advance citizens' delibera-
tions about private interests. Therefore, in contrast to Bickel, liberal
republicans collapse the distinction between institutions that represent
private interests and those that represent collective interests. Conse-
quently, their quest to define community values will interfere with the
process by which some citizens determine their own ends.
Nonetheless, the liberal republicans suggest a means for clarifying
Bickel's conception of legitimate government. Bickel never supported
his assertion that citizens of representative democracies come to en-
dorse common principles that they seek to give priority over their pri-
vate interests. This assertion underlies his defense of judicial
authority as well as his conception of legitimate government. The am-
biguity of this claim leads Bickel's readers to believe that the Court's
authority receives democratic sanction because it is derived from en-
forcing community values.
The liberal republicans focus attention on the benefits citizens
gain from participatory rights that enhance the environment in which
they arrange their ends. Although they treat these benefits as deriva-
tives of the process that defines community values, these benefits must
have priority over collective ends. Yet, the liberal republicans are
able to identify these benefits because political participation enhances
citizens' deliberations about private interests. It seems likely that citi-
196. See supra text accompanying notes 24-40.
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zens would become attached to a political community in which demo-
cratic institutions provide a common benefit that is independent of
citizens' particular interests. Citizens of such a community might also
agree that the value of these benefits justifies the expansion of polit-
ical authority and would acknowledge that the principles that govern
the operation of their political community should take precedence
when they conflict with private interests. This hypothesis is left for a
future essay.
